Introduction to Psychology: Lecture 12 Transcript
February 26, 2007
Professor Paul Bloom: So what we're doing today is continuing on the theme of
emotions. "Emotions" is a two-part lecture and we're continuing along certain
themes.
I want to begin by responding to a question which was raised in the last class
concerning smiling and nonhuman primates. It was a very good question. The issue
was: we know that humans have different sorts of smiles to convey different
sorts of information. The question was, "do nonhuman primates, like chimpanzees
or gorillas or gibbons, have the same many sorts of smiles?" So, I contacted the
world's expert on smiling, who did not return my e-mails. So, I contacted the
second world's expert on smiling who told me that the answer is "no," that
primate--nonhuman primate smiles actually correspond almost entirely to
appeasement smiles. They're "don't hurt me" smiles. They're equivalent to the "coy
smile" that we saw on humans. But that nonhuman primates do not use smiles for
greetings; there's no equivalent to the "greeting smile" or "Pan Am smile"; nor
do they use them as genuine expressions of happiness. There's no equivalent to
the "Duchenne smile." That's as far as I know. If the world's expert gets back
to me and says something different, I'll keep you posted.
Another thing. Going back to the beginning theme of the class, what we started--just
to review, we talked about the different functions of emotions. And then we
talked about smiling and facial expressions. And then we turned to some--to a
nonsocial emotion, the case of fear. And then we shifted to social emotions. And
we talked about social emotions towards kin and the special evolutionary reasons
that would lead them to evolve. And as we were ending, we were talking about the
relationship between an animal and its children, particularly in cases like
humans and birds and mammals where there tends to be a close relationship with
our children.
We invest in quality, not quantity. I might produce very few children in my
life. And my evolutionary trick then is to focus very intently on them and make
sure they survive. If I were to produce 100 children, I could stand to lose a
few, but if I just produce five in my lifetime or two or one, they become very
precious to me. And so, the story of the evolution of a species like us involves
a long period of dependence and deep, deep bonds between the parent and the
child. And that's part of what I talked about, how parents respond to children.
And I want to begin this class by giving an illustration from a documentary
about parental response to children, but I want to give it in a species that's
not us. And here is why. I'll explain why with an analogy. I have a friend of
mine who studies the psychology of religion. He studies why people hold
religious beliefs. And he tells me that when he's talking to a non specialist,
somebody not in the field, he doesn't ever tell them, "Yeah, I'm really
interested in why people believe in the Bible or why people light the candles on
Sabbath or why people go to church" because these are religions that people
around here hold, and if you tell people you study them they'll sort of be
puzzled, "why would you want to study something like that" or offended. If you
want to talk about the psychology of religion to an audience like this, what you
do is you start with the exotic. So, you start by talking about people who put
butter on their heads.
Dan Sperber talks about a culture where the men put butter on their heads in the
summer. And it kind of melts and that's part of--one of the things that they do
or--you talk about a culture that believes in spirits or that trees can talk.
You say you're studying it and they say, "Oh, that's interesting. I wonder why
they believe that?" And you use that as a way to look at more general facts that
exist even in our culture. You use the fact that we don't take the exotic for
granted as a way to motivate the scientific study of things we do take for
granted.
And this is, of course, true more generally. This was the point in the William
James quote when he talked about things that are natural to us and noticed that
some very odd things are equally natural to other species. And it's true, I
think, in particular when we talk about things like the love we have for our
children. So, one way to look at the love we have for our children
scientifically, isn't to look at it head-on, because the love we feel towards
our own children feels sacred, it feels special, but look at it in other species.
And so, one of the nicest illustrations of this is the Emperor penguin, which
was--which--whose childcare and mating practices were dramatized in a wonderful
movie called "March of the Penguins." And this is interesting because they had
this incredibly elaborate and quite precarious system of generating and taking
care of offspring.
So, I want to show you a brief clip of the movie to illustrate some parts of
this. What they do at the beginning, which is not--which leads up to this, is
they take a very long trek from the water to their breeding grounds. Their
breeding grounds is--are protected from the wind and they're on a firm piece of
ice so they could hold the whole pack. They do the breeding there and it's there
that the eggs are created. So, this is where the movie begins at this point. [clip
playing]
"March of the Penguins" was the second best--second most popular documentary of
all time, beaten only by "Fahrenheit 9/11." And people responded to it in
different ways, which are informative when we think about the generalizations
you could make from animal behavior to human behavior. Some conservative
commentators saw this as a celebration of family values, such as love and trust
and monogamy. Some liberals, who hate everything that's good and true, [laughter]
responded by saying, "Well, yeah, they're monogamous for one breeding season.
It's a year. Then they go and find another mate. If you add it up, it's pretty
slutty." [laughter]
I think more to the point, people were impressed and stunned by the rich and
articulate and systematic behavior that these animals were showing. Plainly,
they didn't pick it up from television, movies, culture, learning, schooling,
and so on. To some extent, this sort of complicated behavior came natural to
them. And it's understandable that some proponents of intelligent design, or
creationism, pointed to this as an example of how God creates things that are
deeply, richly intricate so as to perpetrate the survival of different animals.
From a Darwinian standpoint, the Darwinian would agree with the creationist that
this couldn't have happened by accident, this is just far too complicated, but
would appeal to the--to this as an exquisite example of a biological adaptation,
in particular a biological adaptation regarding parental care to children shaped
by the fact that children share the parents' genes and so parents will evolve in
ways that perpetrate the survival of their children.
Then there's the other direction, which is how children respond to parents, how
the young ones are wired up to resonate and respond in different ways to the
adults around them. And we quickly talked about some different theories of this.
And I'll just review what we talked about last class. Babies will develop an
attachment to whoever is closest. They'll usually prefer their mothers because
their mothers are typically those who are closest to them. They'll prefer her
voice, her face, her smell. It used to be thought that there is some sort of
magical moment of imprinting that when the baby is born, the baby must see his
or her mother and "boom," a connection is made. If the baby doesn't, terrible
things will happen with attachment later on. This is silly. There is no reason
to believe there's some special moment or special five minutes or special hour.
It's just in the fullness of time babies will develop an attachment to the
animal that's closest to it. They will recognize it as, at an implicit level, at
an unconscious level, as their kin.
Well, how does this work? How does the baby's brain develop--come to develop an
emotional attachment to that creature? Well, you remember from Skinner that
operant conditioning could provide a good answer to this. And this is known as
the "Cupboard Theory," which is babies love their moms because their moms
provide food. It's the law of effect. It's operant conditioning. They will
approach their mothers to get the food from them. And they will develop an
attachment because their mother provides food. And this is contrasted with a
more nativist, hard-wired theory developed by Bowlby which claims that there's
two things going on. There is a draw to mom for comfort and social interaction
and fear of strangers.
Now, in the real world, it's difficult to pull apart these two means of
attraction because the very same woman who's giving you comfort and social
interaction is also the one giving you milk. But in the laboratory you can pull
them apart. And that's what Henry Harlow did in the movies you saw last week. So,
Harlow exposed primates to two different mothers. One is a wire mother. That's a
Skinnerian mother. That's a mother who gave food. The other is a cloth mother
set-up so that she'd be comfortable and give warmth and cuddling. And the
question is, "Which one do babies go for?" And as you can remember from the
movies, the results are fairly decisive. Babies go to the wire mother to eat--as
one of the characters said, "You've got to eat to live." But they viewed the--they
loved the cloth mother. They developed an attachment to the warm, cuddly mother.
That's the one they used as a base when they were threatened. That's the one
they used as a base from which to explore.
Okay. And that actually--Oh, that's just--I have a picture. And that actually
takes me to the--Oh, except for one thing, it almost takes me to the end of the
question of our emotions towards kin. One question you could ask is, "What if
there's no contact at all?" Now, you could imagine the effects of how--A lot of
people are interested in the question of the effects of the child's early
relationship to adults around him or her in how the child turns out later. This
becomes hugely relevant for social debates like daycare. So for instance, a lot
of psychologists are interested in the question, "Is it better for a child to be
raised by a parent, usually a mother, or does it make a difference if the child
goes to daycare? What if the child goes to daycare at six months? What if the
child goes to daycare at two years? How does this affect the child?" The short
answer is, nobody really knows. There's a lot of debate over whether or not
there are subtle differences and it's deeply controversial. But we do know that
it doesn't make a big difference. We do know that if you got raised by mom, or
perhaps mom and dad, or maybe just dad all through your life until going off for
school and I--my parents threw me in a daycare at age three months--it's not
going to make a big difference for us, maybe a subtle difference though it's not
clear which way it would go. But it won't make a big difference.
But what if there's no contact at all? What if--What about terrible
circumstances where people get no cloth mother, they get nobody for attachment?
This is a really--In the real world, of course, you can't do experiments on this.
And in the real world with humans, this only happens in tragic cases. But this
has been studied. So Harlow, again, raised monkeys in solitary confinement so
they were raised in steel cages with only a wire mother. In other words, they
got all the nutrition they needed but they got no mothering. It turned out that
you kind of get monkey psychotics. They're withdrawn. They don't play. They bite
themselves. They're incompetent sexually. They're incompetent socially. They're
incompetent maternally. In one case, one of these monkeys raised in solitary
confinement was artificially inseminated. When she had a child she banged its
head on the floor and then bit it to death. So, you need to be--you need--This
shows--This is kind of a stark demonstration that some early connection, some
early attachment is critical for the developing of a primate.
Obviously, you don't do these experiments with people but there are natural
experiments, humans raised in harsh orphanages with little social contact, and
these children--If the--In other words, they get fed, barely, but nobody picks
them up and cuddles them. These children, if this happens for long enough, they
end up with severe problems with social and emotional development. From an
emotional point of view, they're often insatiable. They really need cuddling and
support or they're apathetic, they don't care at all. Now, there's some sort of
good news, which is if you get these people or these monkeys early enough you
can reverse the effects of this bad development. So, there's some research done
with monkey therapists. So then, what they do is they take the monkey, they
raise it in a steel cage, the monkey comes out, the monkey is kind of psycho,
and then they send in a younger monkey who is just goofing around, jumping all
around the place and everything. And experience with this younger monkey who
just follows them around and clings to them leads to gradual improvement. It
makes the solitary monkey become better.
There might be a similar effect with humans. So one story more about--of an
anecdote than an experiment was a situation where at the age of one and a half,
children were taken away from a really harsh orphanage where they had no contact
and brought into a home for mentally retarded women where these women gave them
plenty of contact and cuddling and apparently, from what we know, brought them
back to normal. And this is all I want to talk about, about the emotions we feel
towards our kin, towards our children, and towards our parents. Any questions or
thoughts? Yes.
Student: Do children in orphanages comfort each other?
Professor Paul Bloom: It's a good question. Do children in orphanages comfort
each other? I don't know. The situation probably wouldn't be there--The problem
is children in orphanages who are in these terrible situations tend to be babies
and very young and they wouldn't be thrown together in situations where they
could comfort each other. It's a really interesting question. What if it was a
situation where children were raised without a supportive cloth mother at all,
would not be able to pick them up and hold them, but they could play amongst
themselves and support each other? I don't know the answer to that.
Teaching Assistant: Yes.
Professor Paul Bloom: Yes? Is there evidence on that?
Teaching Assistant: Yes, there is. [inaudible]
Professor Paul Bloom: Yes. [laughter] The answer is there is evidence, [laughs]
as everybody knows, [laughter] that this sort of--amongst the young, support can
actually help the monkey and the children. Somebody else had a question here?
Yes.
Student: What does that tell us about the middle ground, if the parent is
comforting just a little bit and then not that much [inaudible]
Professor Paul Bloom: Right. So this is--The question is, "What does that tell
us about the middle ground?" So this is an extreme case but what do we know
about the middle case? Say your parent--You're not raised in a cage, you're not
in a Romanian orphanage, but your parents just don't pick you up very much. They
don't love you very much. There's no good evidence that that has any effect on a
person. The problem is, and we're going to talk about this in much more detail
in a couple of weeks, is it's true that parents who aren't affectionate have
kids that aren't affectionate but it's not clear this is because of a genetic
connection or an environmental connection. The one thing we do know is that in
the middle ground, effects tend not to be dramatic. So when you get away from
extreme cases, effects are hard to see and require careful experimental research
to tease out. I think what it's safe to say for a lot--for everything but the
severe conditions is we don't know what kind of effects there are. But if there
are effects they are not big and dramatic ones.
Okay. Animals' good feelings, animals' emotional attraction to their kin, is not
a huge puzzle from an evolutionary point of view. Evolution is driven by forces
that operate on the fact of how many genes get reproduced and replicated among
your descendants. So, it makes sense that animals would be wired-up to care for
their kids. It would make sense that kids who are wired-up to survive would
develop attachments to their parents. What's more of a puzzle though is that
animals, including humans, seem to have exquisitely complicated relationships
with non-kin. In particular, animals are nice to non-kin. You are nice to people
that you're not related to. There are a lot of examples of this. Animals groom
one another. You go, you pick off the lice and the bugs off your friend; they
pick it off you. They give warning cries.
So, warning cries--All sorts of animals give warning cries. You are--I don't
know. You're a little animal and a big animal comes charging and you say, "Hey!"
Oh. You may sort of cry and everybody runs away. And that's very risky for you
but you do it anyway, often to protect people you aren't related to. Often
animals share childcare. And from a cold-blooded, natural selection, survival-of-the-gene
point of view, you would imagine that if you lend me your kid for the day I
would eat him for the protein and "it's not my genes and actually it gives more
for my kids." That's not quite how it works though.
Animals share food. In fact, that animal, hugely ugly, the vampire bat, shares
food. What happens is the vampire bat--vampire bats live in caves and they fly
out. And what they do is often a bat will strike it big. She'll find a horse,
for instance, bite the horse, pump in tons of blood and then fly back. And what
it does is it doesn't keep it to itself. Rather, it goes around the whole cave
and vomits blood into the mouth of all the other vampire bats so everybody
benefits. Isn't that nice? [laughter] Now, what you're tempted to say is, "Well,
that's really nice. Everybody benefits," but this raises a puzzle from the
evolutionary point of view.
Remember, animals benefit more, and to this situation, animals benefit more by
working together than by working alone. The benefits outweigh the costs. This is
known as "reciprocal altruism" meaning my behavior to you, my good behavior to
you, my altruism for you, is predicated on the idea of reciprocation, "I'll
benefit from you." And you imagine how vampire bats, for instance, why this
makes sense. This is--If you're a vampire bat, it's a better system when anybody
strikes it big to feed you rather than for anybody who strike it big, use the
blood and then spit out all the rest of it. But here's the problem. Here's why
it's such a puzzle. The problem is the existence of cheaters. And in economics
and sociology these are also known as "free-riders." And what a cheater or free-rider
does is it takes the benefits without paying the cost. Imagine two genes.
Imagine one builds a vampire bat that accepts blood from others and shares blood.
The other gene accepts blood from others and doesn't share blood. In the long
run, "B" will actually out-produce gene "A" because in fact, "B" will be healthy
while other vampire bats get sick. And then so the offspring will do better.
An even sharper example is an example of warning cries. So, gophers give warning
cries when there's a predator. It is extremely adaptive to give a warning cry.
Sorry. It's extremely adaptive to respond to a warning cry. You hear a warning
cry, you-- "Oh, crap," you run away. It is not very adaptive to give a warning
cry. A really good solution then is to listen to warning cries but not to give
them. Suppose we had a system--It is very adaptive when people are going to the
bar, when people buy drinks to accept the drinks. It is not so adaptive, from
the standpoint of one's wallet, to buy people drinks. Here is a solution. Accept
drinks but don't pay for drinks. And if everybody fell to that solution, the
idea of buying a round would fade. So, there is the puzzle. Since cheating--Since
a cheater, in the short run, can always out-win--does better than a non-cheater,
how could this cooperation evolve? How could it be an evolutionarily stable
strategy?
And the answer is "cheater detection." Reciprocal altruism can only evolve if
animals are wired up to punish cheaters. Now, that requires a lot of mental
apparatus. You have to recognize cheaters, you have to remember cheaters, and
you have to be motivated to punish cheaters. And not every animal has this
degree of complicated apparatus but actually we know that vampire bats do. So,
in one clever study--So the theory says--the evolutionary theory says "yeah, I
see what these vampire bats are doing," but you see--and this is a case where
evolution makes a nice prediction that couldn't evolve unless bats are keeping
track. If bats aren't keeping track, then the system could never exist because
the cheaters would just take it over. They must be watching for cheaters.
So, the experiment which was done is you--a vampire bat strikes it big, it flies
back, and then you keep it--as a scientist you keep it from giving blood to
anybody else. Then what happens? Well, what happens is when the other bats
strike it big they starve the selfish bat, just as if we go to bars and
everybody buys a round except for me. And this happens over and over and over
again. Pretty soon you're going to buy a round but you're not going to give me
one. And so, just as humans are keeping their eyes out for people who are taking
the benefits without paying the costs, so are other animals. And it is argued
that this sensitivity to cheating, this focus on reciprocation, plays a powerful
role in the evolution of social behavior and the evolution of social emotions.
And a classic illustration of this is The Prisoner's Dilemma. Now, many of you,
I think, have seen The Prisoner's Dilemma in one course or another? It shows up--It
is one of the main constructs in the social sciences. It shows up in cognitive
science, psychology, economics, that you could--The teaching fellows are passing
around something which you're not going to use right away. But for some of you
this is the first time you're going to be exposed to The Prisoner's Dilemma so
let me spell it out.
Here's the idea. You and a friend commit a crime. You rob a bank, for instance.
For the sake of this example, you are prisoner two. You get caught. The police
put you in a little room and they say, "We want to know everything that happened.
In particular, we want you to rat out your friend." Now, here are the options,
and one thing about this is nothing is hidden. The police officer could actually
print out a copy of The Prisoner's Dilemma and put it right in front of you. And
what he could say is, "Look." You're prisoner two. "You could cooperate--Well,
you have two options. You could either cooperate with your friend, you could
stay silent, or you could defect or you could squeal." But the police officer
says, "Look. If you--Let me tell you something. If you cooperate with your
friend and he squeals on you, you'll go to prison for life and he'll walk out.
However, if you squeal on him and he cooperates, he keeps quiet, he'll go to
prison for life and you'll walk out." So, what do you do? Now, on the nice side,
what you can do is you could say, "No. I'm going to be quiet. I'm going to
cooperate." Now, if you could trust your friend to cooperate, you're fine, you
each get a little stint in prison, but of course your friend might defect. Your
friend might squeal.
Here is the important structure of The Prisoner's Dilemma. No matter what you--what
your friend chooses to do, you're better off squealing. So, suppose you're
prisoner two. You believe your friend's going to cooperate with you. He's not
going to be--he's not going to give the information out. Well, then your best
thing to do is squeal on him. What if you believe he's going to squeal on you?
Well, your best thing to do is squeal on him but if you could get your act
together and you could coordinate this, you would both be quiet and get a fairly
minor penalty. And you could see this--This is the standard origin of the
prisoner's dilemma, why it's called "The Prisoner's Dilemma," but you could see
this all over the place. So, here is the logic. The best case for you is to
defect while the other person cooperates. The worst case is to cooperate while
the other person defects.
Back to the police thing. The best case for you is to give up all the
information; the other guy stays silent; you cut a deal; you walk home that day.
The worst case is you're quiet, he cuts a deal, you go to prison for life, but
overall the best is that each cooperate and overall the worst for both is if
each defect. And the reason that makes this tragic is this. Regardless of what
your opponent does, it pays to defect, but if both people defect both are worse
off. I'll give a couple of other examples. No. [referring to a slide] That's
just to show that there's a cartoon corresponding to The Prisoner's Dilemma. It
is that common.
Here's the idea. I am--I break up with my wife. We've been married for a while.
We've decided we're not going to go through it together anymore and we break up.
We're living in separate houses and we're starting to talk divorce. It occurs to
me--Here's me. I put that out there. "Should I get a divorce lawyer?" I ask. Now,
I know divorce lawyers are really expensive. And it's kind of difficult to get a
divorce lawyer. But if I get a divorce lawyer--And so neither one of us get a
divorce lawyer we'll just do okay. We'll get a mediator. We'll split the money
down the middle. That'll be okay but I'm kind of tempted. If I get a divorce
lawyer and she doesn't, my divorce lawyer will take everything she's got. I get
everything, she loses everything. Maybe I should be nice. Hold it. What if she
gets a divorce lawyer and I don't? Well, then I'll lose everything, she'll get
everything. Well, we should both get a divorce lawyer then but we'd both do
pretty badly.
Imagine we're two countries, country "A" and country "B." Should I do nuclear
disarmament? That's pretty good. We'd do okay if both countries disarmed. We
would live our lives; we'll raise taxes; we'll do whatever countries do. But
wouldn't it be cool if I build up my weaponry and they don't? I'll invade, take
everything they got. That's kind of tempting. Uh oh. Also, if I don't do
anything and they do it, they'll invade my country, take everything. So, we both
build up our weaponry and we both do pretty badly. Once you start thinking about
things this way, there's no end to the sort of notions that could fall under The
Prisoner's Dilemma.
A good example is a drug deal. Suppose I want to buy marijuana from you, or "reefer"
as they call it on the street. [laughter] So, I have $1,000 and from you I'd
like to buy a ton of reefer so--I'm rounding off. [laughter] So, you say, "Wonderful.
Wonderful. Let's meet behind the gym, two in the morning on Friday, and we'll do
the exchange. You bring $1,000, I bring the reefer." "Oh, cool. Okay. Good." And
I think, "that's pretty good, a thousand bucks, I get the reefer, you get a
thousand bucks. That's okay, that's the normal thing." But now something occurs
to me. "Nobody's going to go to the cops if things go badly. So instead of doing--bringing
the money, why don't I just bring a gun? You come with your reefer, I stick a
gun in your face, take the reefer, go home."
Maybe I won't do that, but now I worry because you're thinking the same thing.
So, you could show up with a gun, stick the gun in my face, take the thousand
bucks, go home. I'll have no reefer. What will I smoke? [laughter] So, we both
think this way. So, we both show up behind the gym, two in the morning, with
guns. [laughter] Well, that's not as bad for either one of us if I had--I--you
had a gun and I didn't have a gun. But still, we're both worse off than if we
could cooperate and just do the damn trade. And so that's the structure of The
Prisoner's Dilemma.
You can only appreciate The Prisoner's Dilemma by actually doing it. So, here's--here
is a numerical equivalent to The Prisoner's Dilemma. Everybody should have a
card in front of you, a file card. If you don't--If you didn't get a card, a
piece of paper will do just as well. Please write on one side "cooperate" and on
the other side "defect" and then please find a partner with whom to play one
game. This is a one-shot game. One of you is player one. The player on the right-most
side from my right could be player one. The other one is player two. Do you each
have a partner? If you have three people, you could cluster together and do two
and then two and just think. It is actually best if you've never met or spoken
to the person you're about to deal with. And the game is, when I say "go,"
simply show the person your choice.
To be clear, if you are player one and you cooperate and player two cooperates
as well, you each get three dollars. If you are player one and you cooperate
while player two defects, player two gets five dollars and you get bupkis and so
on. On three, just show the card to your opponent, to your person you're playing
with. One, two, three. [laughter] Okay. How many people in this room cooperated?
How many cooperated? How many defected? [laughter] Okay. How many people are now
five dollars richer? Okay. How many of you got nothing? [laughter] Okay. So,
you're learning. You're learning that the person next to you is really an SOB. [laughter]
Now, find the person next to you and you get to play again. And you get to play
five games in a row. Play five games in a row and keep score. You just show it
to each other, record the numbers, show it, show it, show it, show it. Go now. [laughter]
Anybody here win twenty-five dollars? Yes, twenty-five? So you--
Student 1: He cooperated four times and I defected--
Professor Paul Bloom: That's twenty, twenty-one. [laughter] Okay. That's good.
That's good. So, it really is a measure of honesty. [laughs] Anybody win twenty
or more? Fifteen or more. Fourteen or less. Anybody do five or less? You're a
good person. It's good. It's good. You played it with him?
Student 2: Yes.
Professor Paul Bloom: Bad person. [laughter] It's not really about good or bad.
There was a great game once. It's a simple game, but it was a great game, a
great, famous competition a long time ago, about 20 years ago, set up by the
great computer scientist Robert Axelrod. And he put together a competition where
people brought in computer programs to play this game, to play The Prisoner's
Dilemma. And there were sixty-three competitors. And these computer programs
were incredibly--Some of them were very simple, always be nice, always be--always
cooperate, always defect. Some were elegant, prime number solutions and
prototype responses, genetic algorithms crafted to figure out what the other
person was doing and suss them out.
But the winner was developed by Anatol Rappaport. And Anatol Rappaport actually
died about a month ago at quite an old age, a great scientist. What was
interesting about this was he was the winner with his program but his program
was also one of the simplest. It may well have been the simplest. It was called
"Tit-for-Tat" and it worked very simple. It took four lines of basic code. The
first time you meet a new program, cooperate. The first time you meet somebody,
be nice. After that, do on each trial what the other program did on the previous
trial. This beat sixty-two others.
And here is why. It had certain beautiful features. It starts friendly. Remember
the best long-term solution is everybody's be--everybody's nice. It starts off
nice but you can't--it's not a sucker. If you screw with it, it will defect back
on the next turn. It is, however, forgiving. Do you want to get nice with it? Be
nice. If you're nice, it'll be nice back at you later on. It's also transparent,
nothing complicated about it, and that's actually important. It's not merely
that it's not a sucker and forgiving. More to the point, it is--you could tell
it's not a sucker. And you could tell it's forgiving. And this very powerful
algorithm learned to cooperate even in the situation--and helped--learned to
make it out the best even in a situation where there's a risk of cheating and
betrayal.
Some psychologists have argued that our emotions correspond to the different
permutations on The Prisoner's Dilemma. We like people who cooperate with us.
This motivates us to be nice to them in the future much as the Tit-for-Tat
algorithm says, "If you are nice to me now, I'll be nice to you back." We don't
like being screwed with. We feel anger and distrust towards those who betray us.
That motivates us to betray or avoid them in the future. And we feel bad when we
betray somebody who cooperates with us. This motivates us to behave better in
the future. You can break down the cells of The Prisoner's Dilemma in terms of
emotions that they give rise to.
I did an experiment last night with my seven-year-old and my ten-year-old. I
explained to them The Prisoner's Dilemma. I didn't give the divorce lawyer
example but-- [laughter] and we gave them a big thing of chocolate chips and--the
good chocolate chips. We had the good chips and we had the matrix and we had
them play. Now, what they did isn't so interesting, but what's interesting is
they were furious at each other. One of them, the younger boy, was--kept being
betrayed by the older boy including tricks like he'd say, "Okay. Let's both
cooperate." "Yeah. Okay." Then he'd cooperate-- "defect!" And [laughter] the
response was anger, though not actually guilt on the part of the other boy [laughter]
but rage. And we see these sort of things all the time in real life.
You're familiar with The Prisoner's Dilemma but there's another game, which you
might not be familiar with. It's called The Ultimatum Game. How many of you have
encountered The Ultimatum Game? Okay, some of you. Very simple. Choose a
partner. It's a very simple game. When economists study this they actually do
this with real money. I do not have real money to let you do this too. One of
you is "A," one of you is "B." The one on the right most from this side is "A."
The other one is "B." Here is a very simple rule. I'd like "A" to turn to "B"
and make an offer. "A" has ten dollars. You can give "B" any amount you choose
from that ten dollars, from one dollar to ten dollars. "B" can do only one thing.
"B" can accept it; if you accept it, you agree to take home the money and "A"
keeps what ever's left--or reject it. If you reject it, you get nothing. Nobody
gets anything.
Is everybody clear? So "A" is going to say, "I'll give you so and so dollars."
"B" would say, "Okay," in which case "B" walks away with so and so dollars or--and
"A" walks away with whatever rest or "B" could say, "Reject," in which case
nobody gets anything. So, this game comes in two steps. The first thing: I would
like "A" to turn to "B" and make your offer. Don't--"B" doesn't do anything yet.
Make your offer. Your offer should be one word. People are explaining their
offer. Make your offer. Okay. Stage two. Do not negotiate. [laughter] You're
not--I see people waving their hands and it's complicated. It should be a number
from one to ten, a positive integer. Now, "B" --I would like "B" to say one word
and you can say it really loud on three. Accept or reject. One, two, three. [laughter]
Wow. How many people accepted? Anybody reject it? Good. Okay. How many people
offered ten dollars? [laughter] How many people offered more than five dollars?
Okay. How many people offered one dollar? Okay. When you offered one dollar did
you accept? Anybody else offer one dollar? When you offered one dollar did your
partner accept? Okay. How many people offered either four or five dollars? Okay.
This is an interesting game because the person who offered--who accepted one
dollar was being rational. One dollar is better than no dollars. So, the
psychology of human rationality is such that, from a logical point of view, you
should reason one dollar is better than nothing. A rational person should accept
one dollar. And because we're smart, a--you should offer one dollar but not many
of you offered one dollar. Why? Because you knew people are not purely rational.
People, even in a one-shot game, won't accept unfair distributions. They'll
reject them just out of spite. And so, you need to offer more. And this has been
studied from a neuro-economic point of view, which basically provides
neuroanatomical evidence that people--if you offered them one dollar they get
really pissed. [laughter] Nobody likes to be offered a dollar.
Now, there's a more general moral here, which is actually an interesting
surprise of some relevance to everyday life. A rational person is easily
exploited. A rational person's responses to provocations, to assaults will
always be measured inappropriate. If you know I'm rational and you're in a
sharing situation with me, you could say to me, "Hey. Here's a dollar. Hey, Mr.
Rational, a dollar's better than nothing." "Well, okay," because I'm rational.
Similarly, you could mess with me because you could harass me in all sorts of
ways, take things that I own, as long as you reason that a rational person
wouldn't start a fuss about this.
There is some advantage to being irrational, to having a temper. Because if you
have a temper and you're known to be irrational, people are forced, by dint of
your irrationality, to treat you better. Who am I going to take from? The person
who's extremely reasonable or the person who has a hair-trigger temper? Well,
I'm going to pick on a reasonable person because the unreasonable person might
do unreasonable things. And this is faintly paradoxical, but often to be
irrational, or at least to have a reputation for mild irrationality, gives you
an edge.
Now, this isn't focus of provocation but this has also been presented in the
theory of why people fall in love. Suppose you're choosing who to devote your
life to, and it's a matter of huge trust. We're going to raise kids together.
It's very important for you that I don't leave. And I am very rational so I say
to you, "We should mate and have children because I find you the most attractive
of everybody who was available that I've met so far. I'm very rational and so
long as this continues to be the case we'll be together." Well, that's
reasonable and rational but wouldn't you rather be with somebody who's head over
heels in love? Head over heels in love is irrational but it's also, within
certain parameters, endearing because the irrationality of the person means you
could trust them more in the long run, just like the irrationality of somebody
who has a temper means you don't mess with them as much.
The studies have been done more with regard to violence than with love. And in
fact, the irrationality--the benefits of irrational violence have been
translated in terms of the study of homicide and other crimes. Daly and Wilson
describe the cause of murder. Most murder is not caused by reasonable
provocation. Most murder is not rational in its response. Most murder is
generated by insult, curse, petty infraction, but this is not crazy
irrationality. It's adaptive irrationality. Daly and Wilson point out, "in
chronically feuding and warring societies an essential manual--manly virtue is
the capacity for violence. To turn the other cheek is not saintly, but stupid or
contemptibly weak." If I show myself a rational person when picked on or
harassed, I'll be known as somebody you could pick on and harass.
And in fact, it turns out even in the modern world--This is from a New York
Times I just picked up a year ago today. And the point is that the violence is
due to people disrespecting each other or giving a dirty look. And you might
think "isn't that irrational?" But it's not irrational in circumstances where
people live together in an environment where they have to deal with each other
over and over again, and often where there's not much support by the police as
indications they talked about here. What's particularly interesting is this sort
of importance of a reputation for violence differs from culture to culture. And
I've been talking so far in this class--and in fact, so far in this course--about
universals, about things that are built in, things that show up across humans
and other animals. I want to turn now and end this lecture by talking a little
bit about a cultural difference. And it's a psychologically interesting cultural
difference with regard to the emotions. And it's built around the difference
turning around what sociologists call "cultures of honor."
A culture of honor has certain properties. You can't rely on the law. And it has
resources that are easily taken. And sociologists have argued that when those
conditions are met it becomes important to develop a reputation for violent
retaliation. That becomes important. Examples of culture of honors include
Scottish highlanders, Masai warriors, Bedouin tradesmen, and Western cowboys –
all cases where there's resources such as cattle that are vulnerable and easily
taken, but you can't count on calling 911 and having people come help you. But
the culture of honor that's been studied the most by modern psychologists is the
American South.
This was settled by herdsmen and traditionally has less centralized legal
control. So, the sociologists say the American South has more of a culture of
honor than the American North. But how do you know? What does that do? We're
interested in this class in claims about psychology. So, it took Richard Nisbett
and Dov Cohen to study cultures of honors and look at differences. And they
found some interesting differences. Gun laws tend to be more permissive in the
southern--in the American South than the American North. Corporal punishment and
capital punishment tend to be more approved of. Attitudes towards the military
are more positive. In questionnaire studies, people are more forgiving towards
cultures of honor. Somebody insults my woman and I punch him in the face. This
is considered less bad in the American South than the American North. There's a
higher rate of violence but only in certain circumstances. The streets of the
American South as a rule are not more dangerous than the American North. The
difference is there's a higher rate of crimes that are crimes of honor such as,
for instance, if somebody breaks in to my house, me shooting him. Or if somebody
insults me, me killing him.
Now, this is sort of survey studies. So, Nisbett and Cohen did one of the more
interesting psychological studies I have ever heard of. And they did this at--This--Sorry.
This is Nisbett and Wilson. They did this with University of Michigan
undergraduates. They did a subject pool thing like you're doing now, and on it
your demographic information was listed. And what they did was they took white
males who are not Hispanic and not Jewish. That was their sample. Culture of
honor is a phenomena limited to males and they wanted to make it sort of a clean
study so they wanted to focus--get a homogenous sample. So, not Hispanic, not
Jewish. And they provoked them. And the provocation was genius.
What they did was they said--they brought people in to the psychology building,
as you'd be brought in to Kirtland or SSS or Dunham [psychology buildings at
Yale] and they said--they had somebody go in to the desk and they said, "Yeah.
Go down the hall for the experiment." There was a hallway and then you walked
through the hallway. And walking in the other direction at that moment a
graduate student--a male graduate student would start to walk. And he's holding
some files. And what he does is he bumps the person, looks at him and says, "Asshole"
[laughter] and keep walking. Now, to be fair, the graduate student survived
bumping into hundreds of males, calling them assholes and then walking to--Fights
did not break out, nobody was shot. But then they brought the men--now went in
to a room and they were tested. And it turned out that there were differences in
the stress response.
On average, males from the American South showed higher hormone response and
stress response than males in the American North--increases in testosterone and
cortisol. There's always differences in later behavior, the people--suggesting
that they were made angry. They gave differences in fill-in-the-blank questions,
for instance. I don't remember the examples but it's examples like "John went to
the store and bought a 'blank'" and then the northerners would say "and buy an
apple." And the southerners would say "an AK-47 [laughter] to kill that freaking
graduate student." [laughter] Now, again, the American South--people in the
American South were not overall more violent than the American North, but they
were more sensitive to provocations of honor.
Now, when I gave this lecture a few years ago, a southern student contacted me
afterwards and said that she felt that picking out the southern minority at Yale
was in some regard offensive and that people say things at Yale about
southerners--American southerners that they would never say about any other
minority group. So, there's two points I want to make regarding this. One is, of
course, these are average differences. Not every northerner and southerner would
differ along these lines. But another one is I think the effect is real, but
it's not entirely clear that it reflects poorly on the cultures of honor as
opposed to the other cultures. So, Nisbett, for instance, is himself a
southerner and he points out that he went to the North he was most astonished by
how rude people are. And this is because the North--the American North is not
particularly a culture of honor, and so there's less proper behavior towards
other people because there's no fear of retaliation or response. Moreover, the
culture of honor virtues like honor, loyalty, courage and self-reliance, are on
the face of it not necessarily bad things.
In any case, this is an interesting example of how there's an evolutionary
background but culture modifies and shifts it in different ways. More generally,
I've suggested over the last couple of lectures that emotions like fear, the
love you have towards your children, anger, gratitude are not aberrations or
noise in the system. Rather, they're exquisitely complicated motivational
systems that are crafted to deal with the natural and social environment. And we
know this only from an analysis that starts from an evolutionary approach. So,
to bring us back to D'Arcy Thompson, "everything is the way it is because it got
that way." And your reading response for this week is that. [referring to a
slide] And I'll wish you good luck on the exam on Wednesday. And I'll see you
there.
jsl57. (2007, August 01). Transcript 12 - Evolution, Emotion, and Reason: Emotions, Part II. Retrieved September 11, 2008, from Open Yale Courses Web site: http://oyc.yale.edu/psychology/introduction-to-psychology/content/transcripts/transcript12.html.